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such pressure. Great powers are another 
matter, since the financial relationships 
are more symmetrical. One need only 
consider the United Kingdom’s reluc-
tance to limit lucrative financial ties to 
Russia in the wake of the Crimea crisis. 
Dominant as America is financially, 
abuse of that power threatens the dollar’s 
special role in global commerce. Zarate 
relates an anecdote about an event that 
took place in 2003, in which American 
officials proposed cyber attacks against 
Iraqi assets to penetrate bank computers 
around the world covertly and set Iraqi 
account balances to “zero.” Treasury 
successfully argued that the plan would 
shatter confidence and outrage allies, but 
the proposal shows that not all leaders 
see financial weapons in a nuanced light. 
Nations have been slower than “real-
ists” predicted to challenge the U.S.-led 
financial order, likely because the system 
has not harmed their interests. Freez-
ing out terrorists is one thing, but if the 
world perceives the United States as us-
ing access to global finance as a reward 
for good behavior, the use of other 
currencies and development of alterna-
tive payment systems will leap ahead.
Zarate writes as a participant and 
advocate for the policy of financial 
statecraft and for the institution of the 
Treasury Department. One should not 
treat Zarate’s account as definitive his-
tory (diplomats will likely disagree with 
Zarate’s harsh take on the State Depart-
ment), but it is a good, detailed account 
of how policy is made and implemented. 
The book could be better organized. 
It is not quite chronological, not quite 
thematic, and sometimes redundant. 
The military will wish Zarate had 
said more about Treasury and De-
fense Department cooperation. 
Treasury’s War is a useful contribu-
tion, though clearly a participant’s 
account and not a scholarly assess-
ment. It will interest those trying to 
understand how economic tools can 
support national security goals. 
DAVID BURBACH
Naval War College
Wilson, James Graham. The Triumph of Improvi-
sation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engage-
ment, and the End of the Cold War. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell Univ. Press, 2014. 264pp. $29.95
This is an interesting and innovative 
look at the course of the Cold War. It is 
interesting in large part because Wilson’s 
perspective is to look for the unscripted 
moments in the course of the conflict—
the occasions when grand strategy, even 
policy, did not dictate outcomes. To a 
political scientist, this is a refreshing ap-
proach. Political scientists and historians 
often focus too heavily on patterns, the-
ories, and grand schemes. This volume 
is a reminder of the crucial role played 
by policy makers struggling to make 
up their minds at critical junctures.
Wilson’s book is well informed, look-
ing for moments when leaders took 
the initiative, such as when President 
Reagan sensed a crisis in Poland in 
1981. This work struck this nonspecial-
ist as well documented and particu-
larly well researched on the American 
side. One might expect that of Wilson, 
who served as a historian for the U.S. 
State Department. Deliberations over 
nuclear-arms limitations talks receive a 
great deal of Wilson’s attention, as one 
might expect, and his discussion of the 
development of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative is particularly engaging.
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However, prospective readers might be 
warned that this book would probably 
not make good introductory reading to 
the Cold War. Wilson takes it as his task 
to relate the critical junctures and the 
respective leaders’ reasoning at the cost 
of communicating the overall history 
of the conflict—a reasonable approach, 
given the troves of work available on 
the period. His portrait of Mikhail 
Gorbachev is particularly interesting. He 
casts a light on Gorbachev not merely 
as a new thinker who offers a different 
strategic perspective but as a responder 
to American initiatives. Gorbachev 
and Reagan shared an abhorrence of 
nuclear weapons, sometimes letting 
this revulsion outstrip the policies with 
which their advisers were comfortable. 
Wilson’s portrait of the time is an engag-
ing one, capturing to an unusual extent 
how leaders then were trying to under-
stand each other’s motives. “In the last 
years of the conflict, improvisation mat-
tered more than any master plan.” We do 
well to be reminded of this, since there 
is often a temptation to look through 
the lens of history and see outcomes as 
certain and predictable, which is often 
a mistake and the product of psycho-
logical bias rather than cold analysis. 
Wilson’s book is a useful corrective in 
this regard, examining how the role of 
improvisation and accident can play crit-
ical parts at crucial junctures of history. 
ANDREW STIGLER
Naval War College
Willis, Sam. In the Hour of Victory: The Royal 
Navy at War in the Age of Nelson. New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2013. 416pp. $24
British author Sam Willis’s latest book, 
in what is a fast-growing and impres-
sive collection of naval historical works, 
reveals new details of battles previously 
immortalized, shining new light on how 
these battles were conducted. Willis 
titles his book aptly and in a man-
ner appreciative of the primary source 
material he has thrust forward from 
obscurity. Vice Admiral Collingwood’s 
first dispatch to the Admiralty after the 
battle of Trafalgar begins, “The ever 
to be lamented death of Vice Admiral 
Lord Viscount Nelson, who in the late 
conflict with the enemy fell in the hour 
of victory.” The victorious Collingwood 
goes on to describe for his superiors 
and for the British public the circum-
stances that allowed twenty-seven Royal 
Navy ships of the line to dominate a 
larger combined French and Spanish 
fleet. This book analyzes not only the 
original dispatches from Trafalgar but 
also those from several other great fleet 
battles from 1794 to 1806. Specifically, 
the author lays out original dispatches, 
historical context, and skillful interpre-
tations for the battles of the Glorious 
First of June (1794), St. Vincent (1797), 
Camperdown (1797), the Nile (1798), 
Copenhagen (1801), Trafalgar (1805), 
and San Domingo (1806). These giant 
fleet engagements were remarkable in 
several respects, most notably in that 
they marked the last large-scale battles 
of the sailing warfare era, and all rep-
resent overwhelming British victories. 
This work weaves into its narrative 
fascinating insights already known to 
naval historians. How did Britain come 
to dominate all these battles? Numerical 
superiority, though normally paramount 
in sailing warfare, was not enough to 
help the French, Danes, Spanish, or 
Dutch during this era whenever a British 
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